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PIEDMONT v. CARNEY
Uniform 'Commercial Code: Secret Lien Theory Yields
To Race Of Diligence In Conditional 'Sales
Piedmont Land and Development Co. v. Carney'
Debtor owed money to the plaintiff on a note dated
February 5, 1962 and suffered judgment by confession
thereon on March 20, 1962. On March 26, 1962 the debtor
purchased an automobile subject to a conditional sales con-
tract which was assigned to the Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corporation. On April 2, 1962 the Department of Motor
Vehicles issued title on the car and listed a lien thereon
in favor of C.I.T. On April 10, 1962 the plaintiff placed a
ft. fa. on its judgment in the hands of the sheriff who levied
upon the automobile. Although C.I.T. did not record its
conditional sales contract until April 18, 1962, it contended
it was entitled to the proceeds of the sheriff's sale for the
reason that the information in the DMV files constituted
constructive notice to the plaintiff. The Maryland Court
of Appeals stated that the DMV is not a "record office"
and that information filed there could not serve as a basis
for constructive notice. Since no evidence of actual notice
was apparent on the record, the court's decision rested upon
an interpretation of the Conditional Sales Act.' Section 66
read in part:
"Every * * * contract for the sale of goods and
chattels * * * wherein the title thereto * * * is reserved
until the same be paid in whole or in part, or the trans-
fer of title is made to depend upon any condition there-
in expressed and possession is to be delivered to the
vendee, shall in respect to such reservation and con-
dition, be void as to subsequent purchasers, mort-
gagees, incumbrancers, landlords with liens, pledges
[pledgees], receivers, and creditors who acquired with-
out notice a lien by judicial proceedings on such goods
and chattels, * * * until such note, sale or contract be
in writing, signed by the vendee and be recorded, as
provided in this section...."
As the plaintiff was a creditor "who acquired without
notice a lien by judicial proceedings", C.I.T. could prevail
'232 Md. 21, 192 A. 2d 67 (1963).
2 Laws of Md. 1951, ch. 577, § 71; 1941, ch. 875 (emphasis added), re-
pealed by 8 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95B. For discussions of various
problems arising under the Act, see Arnold, Conditional Sale8 of Chattels
in Maryland, 1 MD. L. REV. 187 (1937) ; Notes, 4 MD. L. REV. 82 (1939) ;
13 MD. L. REV. 154 (1953) ; 19 MD. L. REV. 78 (1959) ; 19 MD. L. REV. 157
(1959) ; and 21 MD. L. REV. 160 (1961).
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under this statute only if the word "subsequent" before
"purchasers" also modifies "creditors who acquired without
notice a lien by judicial proceedings". Under this interpre-
tation C.I.T.'s conditional sales contract would not be void
as to plaintiff because plaintiff was a prior creditor, having
lent debtor money prior to March 26. The court, with
Judge Henderson dissenting, found in favor of C.I.T.
Under conventional rules of construction, "subsequent"
modifies the word immediately following it - "pur-
chasers".3 Under the pertinent portion of the Conditional
Sales Act the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that
"subsequent" also modifies the following two named
classes - "mortgagees" and "incumbrancers". 5 After
analyzing the original act passed in 1916 and the various
amendments and cases decided under it, the court con-
cluded that the underlying intent of the statute was to
prevent secret liens and protect those who may have dealt
with the debtor relying on false or misleading appearances
of ownership based upon possession of chattels. Accord-
ingly, only those who dealt with the debtor subsequent to
the time indicia of ownership arose could claim protected
status as a consequence of vendor's failure to record, and
"subsequent" is to be construed as modifying "creditors".
In dissenting, Judge Henderson stated that if "subse-
quent" is to modify the first three classes listed in the
statute (purchasers, mortgagees and incumbrancers) and
also, as the majority finds, the last class (creditors), then
"subsequent" logically must also modify the intervening
three classes - landlords with liens, pledgees and receivers.
"Landlords", he contended, cannot fairly be limited only
to landlords after delivery of the chattel because comple-
tion of the lien by distraint evidently is required. Also,
" 'pledgees' obtain a lien only by delivery of the particular
chattel, so to speak of a 'subsequent' pledgee is meaning-
less." Furthermore, "a 'receiver' represents all creditors,
whether prior or subsequent to the delivery of the chattel
in question."
The basic disagreement between the majority and dis-
sent, however, stems from what each considered to be the
underlying policy of the recording statute. Judge Hender-
son believed that protection to third parties dealing with
the debtor should not be limited to situations where false
'20 M.L.E. Statutes § 90 (1961).
'Mohr v. Sands, 213 Md. 206, 131 A. 2d 732 (1957).
'Automobile Accept. Corp. v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 216 Md. 344,
139 A. 2d 683 (1958), noted in 19 MD. L. REv. 157 (1959) ; Rupp v. Johnston
Co., 226 Md. 181. 172 A. 2d 875 (1961).
6 232 Md., at 33.
PIEDMONT v. CARNEY
appearances of assets are facilitated by secret liens, but
rather that a "race of diligence" concept should control,
whereby the first to secure his interest prevails - whether
the creditor be prior or subsequent.
Since the Maryland General Assembly in its 1963 ses-
sion repealed the Conditional Sales Act as of the same date
that the Uniform Commercial Code7 came into effect, the
specific question of statutory construction presented in the
instant case is unlikely to arise again. At some future time,
however, the Maryland courts may have to decide whether
the "secret lien" or the "race of diligence" concept is to
be applied when deciding appropriate cases under the UCC.
An analysis of Subtitle 9 of the UCC, dealing with
secured transactions, indicates that the "race of diligence"
concept prevails and the result in the instant case would be
changed. Judge Henderson recognized this fact,8 as do
certain of the official comments to the UCC text.'
A convenient procedure for determining the effect of
Subtitle 910 under the facts of the instant case is first to
identify the parties and the transactions involved under
the new language of the UCC. Section 9-301 defines "lien
creditor" in subsection (3) as ". . . a creditor who has
acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment,
levy or the like. . . ." Section 9-107 provides in part that a
"security interest"" includes "a 'purchase money security
interest' to the extent that it is . . . taken or retained by
the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price .... -112 Thus, under the UCC the plaintiff would be
'8 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95B, § 10-101.
8 232 Md., at 32.
'Uniform Commercial Code § 9-312, Example 2, at 684, in which non-
purchase money advances were made against the same collateral, it is
stated that the result of giving priority to the first party to perfect his
interest "may be regarded as an adoption . . . of the idea, deeply rooted at
common law, of a race of diligence among creditors."
10 For a general discussion of secured transactions under Article 9, see
Spivack, Secured Transactions (1963); Summers, Secured Transactions
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 ORa. L. REv. 1 (1962) ; Lee, Per-
fection and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1
(1962); Gilmore, The Purcha8e Money Priority, 76 HAxv. L. REv. 1333
(1963); 1 CooGAN, HOGAN and VAoTS, SECURED TANSACTIONS AND TTIE
UNI Fo RM COMMERCIAL CODE (1963) ; Uniform Commercial Code Annotations,
4 BOST. Cou.. IND. & COMM. L. REv. (1963).
18 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95B, § 1-201(37).
" 'Security interest,' means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance 'of an obligation. The reten-
tion or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding ship-
ment or delivery to the buyer (§ 2-401) is limited in effect to a reserva-
tion of a 'security interest.' The term also includes any interest of a
buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject
to subtitle 9."
28 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95-B, § 9-107(a).
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a lien creditor and C.I.T. would hold a purchase money
security interest. Furthermore, what was formerly known
as a conditional sales contract is one of the types of trans-
actions now subsumed under the general classification of
"security agreement"'" and is usually perfected by the filing
of a "financing statement".14
Under section 9-302(1) (d) a financing statement must
be filed to perfect a security interest in any motor vehicle
that is required to be licensed.' 5 If the motor vehicle is in
the possession of a debtor and no statement is filed, it re-
mains an unperfected security interest; section 9-301 (1) (b)
provides that an unperfected security interest is subordi-
nate to the rights of a "person who becomes a lien creditor
without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected."' 6 Section 9-301 (2) states:
138 MD. CODE) (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95B, §§ 9-201, 9-203(1) (b), 9-208. The
Code does not in terms abolish existing forms of security transactions. See
§ 9-102, Oomment 2. It does, however, recognize that all of the frequently
used security devices have substantially the same purpose; to create
security in personal property as assurance of payment of an obligation.
The Code also recognizes that this singleness of purpose demands a single
lien concept with precise specifications of rights and obligations. Therefore,
the Code -avoids the limitations and restrictions of the older concepts by
applying the single term "security agreement" to all transactions in which
the parties intend to create a security interest. See §§ 9-101, 9-102 and the
definition of security interest in § 1-201(37). The Code concept of a security
agreement, based on intent, is broad enough ito include all existing forms
of security transactions, transactions such as a consignment or memoran-
dum sale, not previously considered to be secured transactions, and new
forms of transactions growing out of expanding commercial concepts. At
the same time, for a variety of policy reasons, certain transactions which
could be included in the term "security agreement" are excluded from the
scope of Article 9 by § 9-104.
' S MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 95B, § 9-302. Section 9-402 describes
the financing statement in detail and sets out its formal requirements.
Sections 9-302(c) and (d) specify limited situations where a purchase
money security interest is perfected without filing, not applicable to the
instant problem. Perfection is not absolute, see note 20 infra.15 The procedural aspects of filing are dealt with in detail in § 9-401
through § 9-406. The proper place to file a financing statement is with the
clerk of the circuit court of the county where the debtor resides, except in
Baltimore City where the Superior Court of Baltimore City should be used.
§ 9-401(1) (b). The statement is effective for a maximum of five years
from the date of filing and will lapse ait that time or 60 days after the
stated maturity date, whichever occurs first, unless a continuation state-
ment is filed prior to the lapse. § 9-403(2). Upon termination of the financ-
ing arrangement a "termination statement" is presented to 'the filing officer,
and the original financing statement may be returned to the vendee. § 9-404.
Also, a "secured party may assign of record all or a part of his rights under
a financing statement by filing a separate written statement .. " § 9-405 (2).
See also, Opinions of Attorney General of Maryland, Daily Record, March 3,
1964 and March 24, 1964.
16 See United v. Potts & Callahan, 231 Md. 552, 191 A. 2d 570 (1963), in
which the court applied Pennsylvania law which embodies the UCC and
held that an unrecorded lease purchase (security) agreement was not valid
as to a subsequent creditor with a judicial lien. See also Girard Trust
Bank v. Lepley Ford, 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351 (1957).
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"If the secured party files with respect to a pur-
chase-money security interest before or within ten days
after the collateral comes into possession of the debtor,
he takes priority over the rights of a ... lien creditor
which arise between the time the security interest at-
taches and the time of filing."' 7
If the vendor (secured party) does not file within the ten
day grace period, he must file prior to the perfection of a
subsequent security interest or lien in order to have priority
over it.' The knowledge which will subordinate a lien
creditor under section 9-301 (1) (b) is actual knowledge,
and mere suspicion of an outstanding unperfected security
interest is not sufficient to make the security interest
superior.' 9
Thus, if the instant case had arisen under the UCC,
since the plaintiff was without actual knowledge of C.I.T.'s
unperfected security interest on April 10, when he became
a lien creditor by delivering the ft. fa. to the sheriff, he
should prevail over C.I.T., which did not perfect its security
interest under section 9-302(1) (d) until filing on April 18
and could not claim the benefit of the ten day grace period
which commenced March 26.
Under the motor vehicle statute, liens may continue to
be shown on certificates of title to automobiles, and this
should often lead to actual knowledge of the security in-
terest. In the absence of actual knowledge, the instant case
and Maryland's departure from the uniform draft in sec-
tion 9-302 (3) (b) make it clear that the listing of a lien on
the title certificate and in the DMV files does not afford
constructive notice. Perfection can be achieved only by
filing with one of the clerks of the specified courts. 21
" See § 9-204 as to the time when a security interest attaches. See In
the Matter of Lucken-bill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957), a bankruptcy
trustee, who had the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor as of the date of
bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c), prevailed
over an installment seller who had not formally complied with filing
requirements. Partial filing prior to bankruptcy made "in good faith" was
not sufficient to constitute knowledge to the trustee under § 9-401(2). To
the same effect In 'the Matter of Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
,s Spivack, op. cit. supra note 10, at 97. As to a subsequent conflicting
security interest, see § 9-312(4).
" § 1-201(25) (c): "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when
he has actual knowledge of it."
20 See discussion in note 15 supra as to filing. Perfection by filing will not
always protect against subsequent purchaser. A recent amendment to the
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323, Pub. L. No. 272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb.
26, 1964) follows this approach favoring subsequent purchaser by creating
an exemption from federal tax liens in the case of motor vehicles if the
purchaser is without actual notice or knowledge of the existence of such
lien, or if before the purchaser obtains notice or knowledge, he acquired
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Under the UCC, as under the prior law as to subse-
quent creditors, the creditor is protected only if he is
ignorant of prior unperfected interest in the chattel;2'
knowledge on his part prevents him from gaining priority
regardless of whether he is "diligent in attaching". On
the other hand, the rights of the holder of a purchase money
security interest remain unaffected by any knowledge he
may have concerning the existence of other creditors, and
his rights are determined solely by the timeliness of his
filing. This result encourages a free flow of credit sales by
protecting a "secured party" vendor merely if he is diligent
in filing. If there is no timely filing of a purchase money
security interest, a general creditor may, by attachment,
obtain a prior lien on the goods sold to the debtor, unless
he knows of the conditional sale and consequently could
not have been misled by any ostensible ownership of
the debtor.
BERRYL A. SPEERT
Fiduciary Duty And Implied Promises
In Prospectus
United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Products, Inc.'
The Carter Products Company, prior to July, 1957, was
a closely held corporation engaged in the manufacture and
marketing of proprietary and toiletry articles. The prin-
cipal and controlling interest in the company was held by
H. H. Hoyt, who had been encouraged by a large minority
interest to establish a public market for the Carter stock.
The company filed a registration statement with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission on July 1, 1957, and the
preliminary and final prospectuses were distributed to the
public for the purpose of publicizing the sale.2 Included
possession of the vehicle and has not thereafter relinquished possession of
the vehicle. Previously, tax liens on motor vehicles were valid if notice
thereof was filed in an office designated by state law or with the clerk of
the United States District Court in the judicial district in which the
property was situated.
2 Lack of knowledge was also required of the judgment creditor under
the old act. Laws of Md. 1951, ch. 577, § 71.
DAILY RMcOR, September 23, 1963 (Md. 1963).
2 The reader should note that the prospectus referred to herein is the
one in effect at the conclusion of the so-called "waiting period", which
normally extends twenty days from the date of filing. The preliminary
and summary prospectuses do not give rise to either contractual or tort
liability prior to the effective date of registration. I LOSS, SECUITIEs
REGULATION 182 (2d ed. 1961) ; 3 LOSS, SEOUTIEs REGULATION 1722 (2d
ed. 1961).
